Category Archives: Publications

Strategy in the Contemporary World – the Cyber Dimension

SITCW 5th Ed

The 5th Edition of Strategy in the Contemporary World was published by Oxford University Press on 31 December 2015, and is available from all good booksellers.

Among the many excellent chapters on all things strategic by some of the leading thinkers around is my updated chapter (originally published in the 4th Edition) titled “The Rise of Cyberpower.

Strategy in the Contemporary World is a great introductory textbook for student and layman alike looking to understand the fundamentals of, and trends in, strategic studies.

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Filed under Books, Cyberpower, Cyberspace, Cyberwar, Professional Military Education, Publications, Shameless Self-Promotion, Strategic Theory, Strategy, Theory of Cyberpower

Geopolitics and Cyberpower: Why Geography Still Matters

AFPI Journal

I have a new article, “Geopolitics and Cyberpower: Why Geography Still Matters,” published in the latest issue of American Foreign Policy Interests, the journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in New York City.

It’s an imperfect first attempt at an issue that is of enduring interest to me, so expect more on this from me down the road. That said, all comments and critiques are welcome. I hope you enjoy it: 10803920%2E2014%2E969174

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Filed under American Foreign Policy Interests, Cyberpower, Cyberspace, Cyberwar, Geography, Geopolitics, National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Publications, Shameless Self-Promotion, Strategic Theory, Strategy, Stuxnet, Theory of Cyberpower

Realism Endures: Why States Seek Digital Arms and Will Continue to Do So


I posted earlier today about my forthcoming participation in the Citizen Lab’s Cyber Dialogue 2013 in Toronto, 17-18 March. The Director of the Citizen Lab, Ron Deibert, invited a number of participants (including yours truly) to write blog posts for the Dialogue in order to spur discussion and debate.

My contribution, “Realism Endures: Why States Seek Digital Arms and Will Continue to Do So,” can be found here. In this short essay I make a classical realist argument that states are the primary actors in cyberspace, and that cyberspace compounds state insecurity. So long as insecurity persists in international politics it is only logical – and tragic in the spirit of the Ancient Greeks – that states will continue to seek out digital arms in order to mitigate the anarchy.

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Filed under Arms Control, Canada, Cyberpower, Cyberspace, Cyberwar, Publications, Realism, Ron Deibert, Shameless Self-Promotion, The Citizen Lab, Thucydides, University of Toronto, Web/Tech

Defense News: A New Opportunity for US-Asian Space Cooperation

Japan IGS

My Tokyo associate Lance Gatling and I are now three for three. A shortened version of the Space News opinion piece by us, published on February 11, is published in this week’s edition of Defense News, and can be read here.

Opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region for U.S. space industry abound!

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Filed under Asia-Pacific, Defense News, Emerging Space Powers, Lance Gatling, Publications, Shameless Self-Promotion, Space News, Spacepower, U.S. National Security Space, U.S. Space Industry

An Investment Strategy for US National Security Space


In collaboration with my friend and George C. Marshall Institute boss Jeff Kueter, I authored a Special Report for the Heritage Foundation titled “An Investment Strategy for US National Security Space.”

Jeff and I wrote the report last summer, partly during when I was still working for the U.S. Air Force. For the purposes of full disclosure, when I was employed by the U.S. Air Force I wrote this report in my own spare time using my own private resources.

The report can be accessed for free, but I am posting the abstract here for those hard-pressed for time to wade through a 26 page document:

Today’s space systems fulfill five purposes: (1) environmental monitoring; (2) communications; (3) position, navigation, and timing; (4) integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; and (5) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. These missions are integral to a new American way of warfare. Direct and indirect challenges to American power in space are growing. Other nations are expanding their capabilities to interdict or deny U.S. access to space. Mounting fiscal pressures will likely necessitate changes in national “security space” force structures and acquisition approaches. This Special Report explores the implications of these challenges on U.S. national security space programs and policies. It sets the context for future decision making, providing insight into the myriad issues—from allied capability and intentions to extant arms control proposals—that will likely influence these decisions.The United States is approaching a critical juncture on its investments in national security space capabilities. This juncture is imminent due to the convergence of three forces: (1) a fundamental shift in U.S. defense and diplomatic strategy from the western to the eastern Eurasian landmass—the so-called pivot toward the Asia-Pacific; (2) a large number of the national security space capabilities upon which the United States and its allies critically rely are now legacy systems in need of upgrades and replacement; and (3) severe fiscal pressures on Department of Defense and intelligence community budgets. As the strategic context shifts, the military’s dependence on space systems becomes ever more acute. Since the 1990s, military use of space has grown exponentially, but new strategic demands, bolstered by the accumulating demands of technology, require development of entirely new national security space systems if the United States is to meet future national security challenges with plausible preparedness.

I welcome any comments on this report, and – of course – any other publications I post here.

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Filed under Arms Control, Asia-Pacific, Australia, Diplomacy, Emerging Space Powers, George C. Marshall Institute, Heritage Foundation, Israel, Japan, Jeff Kueter, NATO, Publications, School of Advanced Air & Space Studies, Shameless Self-Promotion, South Korea, Spacepower, U.S. National Security Space, United States, Vietnam

A New Chance for U.S.-Asian Space Cooperation

Asia from Space

The February 11, 2013, edition of Space News has published the second essay by Lance Gatling and I on the opportunities for US.-Asia-Pacific national security space cooperation. Our first installment was published in The Straits Times (Singapore), on Friday, February 8, 2013 – and can be found here.

Subscribers to Space News can access the essay here; I provide the text of the essay for non-subscribers below:

A New Chance for U.S.-Asian Space Cooperation

By Lance Gatling, John B. Sheldon | Feb. 11, 2013

The enactment of much-needed satellite export control reforms in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is not only a welcome opportunity for the U.S. space industry to compete on a more level playing field with international competitors, it also offers a unique opportunity for U.S. commercial interests to dovetail with Washington’s strategic interests in the vitally important Asia-Pacific region.

Hopefully, the new export control regime set out in the 2013 NDAA is not just the only step on the road to comprehensive reform of how the U.S. regulates sensitive, dual-use space technologies. If properly structured and administered, it will also provide the long-sought opportunity for the U.S. space industry to compete on a more equal basis in the expanding and increasingly important Asia-Pacific space market by providing simplified and faster export procedures and administration compared with the more restrictive and complex export controls of the State Department’s Munitions List currently in place.

While still providing adequate export controls, the speed and transparency of a new system should result in U.S. procedures being more competitive with European export control regimes. But while this change provides much desired clarity and transparency in commercial and civil space export procedures, the opportunity to address broader U.S. bilateral — and possibly multilateral — cooperation in Asia-Pacific national security space should not be forgotten.

Responding to years of discussion and the President’s Export Control Reform Initiative, the 2013 NDAA allows the president to propose removing satellites and related items from the State Department’s highly restrictive Munitions List — a compilation of sensitive, controlled militarily-useful technology and hardware — and restore them, subject to conditions to be proposed by the administration, to the Department of Commerce’s less restrictive yet still carefully controlled Control List of dual-use technologies, which is how they were successfully managed from 1996 to 1999. Such a change will not mean that all requests to export satellites and related subcomponents abroad will be automatically granted, but any reasonable Commerce Department system should make it much easier and quicker for policymakers to approve most exports when U.S. manufacturers and their customers abroad meet appropriate criteria. This is especially important when the reality today is that the technology in question is more and more widely available throughout the world; failing to recognize this harms U.S. strategic and commercial interests.

While the industrial and commercial benefits of satellite export control reforms are obvious and welcome, more broadly the timing of this policy change may also present an opportunity for U.S. commercial interests to dovetail with Washington’s strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, U.S. satellite export control reform may provide a unique opportunity for the United States to further strengthen key close alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia and Singapore; reinforce links with traditional friends such as the Philippines and Thailand; and expand ties with countries such as Indonesia, Myanmar, Mongolia and Vietnam.

Most of these Asia-Pacific allies are established, new or aspirational space powers and seek to exploit satellite capabilities for civil as well as national security purposes. The region is already a prime commercial and civil market for American space systems, turnkey space services and even significant industrial cooperation in some areas; U.S. willingness to offer Asia-Pacific allies appropriate levels of cooperation and visibility into national security space solutions should provide additional opportunities on all sides. Also, a glance at the current web of telecommunications, Earth observation, maritime shipping and fishing, and weather satellite coverage of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as its soaring telecommunications demand, shows that international cooperation in broad area communications coverage, maritime domain awareness, primary and alternate ground stations, and remote sensing systems can and does serve a number of nations and interests.

Japan, South Korea and Australia are now developing their own space systems capable of supporting national security tasks. With the 2013 NDAA export control reforms, these nascent efforts might be further encouraged and strengthened by deeper U.S. engagement and space capacity building — which would be consistent with the 2010 U.S. National Space Policy. Once the new export control regime is established, the United States should study opportunities to deepen cooperation with these allies. For example, Japan has expressed interest in the co-development of certain space systems with the United States that could be of utility to U.S., Japanese and perhaps other countries’ security interests. Similar opportunities might be explored with South Korea, which has supported the development of an increasingly sophisticated national satellite manufacturing and launch capability. Certainly there are many technical and operational details to be mastered before meaningful cooperation can result, including compartmentalization and protection of operational and technical information, but these two advanced economies have much to contribute under the right conditions. Other countries’ interests should be considered, too, as the Japanese have engaged Vietnam to provide radar remote sensing satellites, and Thailand and Mongolia seek their own remote sensing capabilities to monitor vastly different environments, ranging from Mongolia’s plains to tropical jungle, but which of necessity will use very similar orbits and excess capacity that will be useful to several countries.

With the fulcrum of the global economy increasingly shifting towards Asia, and the myriad security challenges that trouble the region, the pursuit of the strategic attributes of space power — perspective, access, presence and extended strategic depth — by any number of Asian nations will both create economic opportunities and provide opportunities to ameliorate the potential for conflict. Space technologies not only provide national and international connectivity, but also can revolutionize land and resource use as well as urban planning. These benefits are of huge importance to resource-hungry nations with insufficient infrastructure and growing population pressures. Addressing these challenges with new, innovative space applications can create value and new economic opportunities from satellite communications, navigation and remote sensing systems. Also, new value-added services may be developed with controlled, national-level data; as the space segment hardware is already developed and proved, there may be substantial opportunity in the development of software and distribution systems, technologies for which the technical and economic barriers to entry are relatively low, and may prove attractive and viable to any number of Asian countries.

At the same time, such systems can enhance the national security of U.S. friends and allies by providing redundant and secure communications, and by supporting greater and more efficient border security and maritime domain awareness and exclusive economic zone monitoring. Dual-use remote sensing space systems also can help countries more efficiently utilize scarce naval and air assets in ensuring regional freedom of navigation and the defense of sovereign rights, such as the monitoring and patrolling of fisheries and exclusive economic zones.

Space systems contribute to national and regional security because of their unique strategic attributes of perspective, access, presence and enhanced strategic depth. Satellites in orbits ranging from 241 to 35,880 kilometers in altitude occupy the oft-cited “high ground,” providing a unique perspective from which to observe a large swathe of Earth’s surface. This broad perspective, combined with the ability of satellites to legally overfly the sovereign territory of other countries (guaranteed in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty as ratified by every Asia-Pacific nation except Cambodia), provides legal access to observation beyond national boundaries. In turn, this legal access confers a measure of presence over areas of strategic interest for the purposes of surveillance, as is the case with space-based maritime domain awareness.

This, combined with the increasing technical capabilities of small Earth observation satellites — such as the U.S. Air Force’s Operationally Responsive Space satellites or the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Space Enabled Effects for Military Engagements microsatellite development program — is one of the reasons that small satellites in low Earth orbit are increasingly performing the Earth observation and reconnaissance roles heretofore performed by aircraft. The final link in this chain, affordable launch services for small satellites, is being pursued by a number of countries and commercial companies, and is another potential area of international cooperation because of the wide appeal of its utility.

The combination of perspective, access and presence provides the fourth attribute of space power — enhanced strategic depth. The ability to establish a long-term capability to see beyond national boundaries and access otherwise denied territory, or to observe quickly vast areas over these places, such as oceans, enhances strategic depth since it allows countries to literally trade space for time. This can lead to better-informed decision-making as well as more measured and improved response options to potential provocations and crises.

Not only can space systems provide improved national and regional security for U.S. friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific, they could also help the United States better manage its security commitments in an era of tremendous fiscal constraints; consequently, it is very much in the economic and strategic interests of the U.S. to help its friends and allies in the region become dependable space powers in order to better defend themselves, which in turn would strengthen regional security.

The growing realization of the importance of coordinating regional space policy can be seen in the recent introduction of national security space issues to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and the growing dialogue on civil space issues in the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum. With or without strategic advantages accruing to the U.S. as a result of engagement, the reality of space technology today is that an increasing number of countries, including the U.K. and other European countries, Russia, China and Japan, are willing to provide their expertise in space hardware and launch services for either commercial or “soft power” political engagements to any number of aspiring spacefaring nations.

Space cooperation on dual-use space systems will demonstrate to allies that the U.S. is prepared to take relationships to a new level of trust, as the technology involved has been seen as overly guarded for years. For the United States, well-coordinated, broader engagement could result in allies or cooperative bilateral systems shouldering some of the onerous costs of providing much-needed information on the region by filling blind spots or providing redundancy. Further, active dual-use space cooperation engagement would provide a strategically and politically powerful statement of commitment from America to its allies in the region. The net result could mean a greater level of political and strategic commitment to trans-Pacific security relationships and greater trust in partnership with America in space. The time is right for this step.


Lance Gatling is president of Nexial Research Inc., an aerospace and defense consultancy based in Tokyo. John B. Sheldon is president of the Torridon Group LLC, an international space and cyberspace policy and strategy consultancy based in Washington.

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Filed under ASEAN, Asia-Pacific, Australia, Emerging Space Powers, Indonesia, Japan, Lance Gatling, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, Publications, Shameless Self-Promotion, South Korea, Spacepower, Thailand, United States, Vietnam

The need for greater Asia-Pacific space security cooperation is now


In light of China’s latest missile defense test (which, of course, has obvious anti-satellite (ASAT) utility), the need for U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific to start cooperating on space security issues has never been greater.

Writing in The Straits Times of Singapore, Lance Gatling (of Nexial Research Inc. in Tokyo, Japan) and I outline the threat to space systems in the Asia-Pacific region and suggest modest proposals that might get meaningful space security cooperation underway in the region.

Unfortunately, The Straits Times website is entirely pay-walled, but a copy of the Op-Ed by Lance and I can be found here: Grounding the threat of space wars – Gatling and Sheldon – The Straits Times – 020820123


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